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Permanent Sovereign COoperation (PESCO) to 
Underpin the EU Global Strategy 
Jo Coelmont 
The EU now has a full-fledged Global 
Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy – 
and defence. Just in time. The EUGS 
includes a clear political level of ambition 
as well as a call to define the 
corresponding military level of ambition 
and the required capabilities. The list of 
strategic military shortfalls, first identified 
in 2000 at the start of the then European 
Security and Defence Policy, will obviously 
grow still longer. For new tasks have to be 
integrated, while in the last fifteen years, in 
spite of all the good intentions about 
“pooling and sharing”, not a single 
existing strategic shortfall has been solved. 
Because a shortfall cannot be pooled – one 
can only share one’s frustration at that. No 
wonder therefore that Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is once 
again on the agenda as a potential game 
changer. Yet the Member States are very 
reluctant to launch it. Why? 
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in point. Clearly Member States are not averse 
to the principle of PESCO as such nor to the 
permanent mutual commitment that it entails. 
Then why are they reluctant to launch PESCO 
in the EU framework?  
 
SOVEREIGNTY? 
The answer is simple: PESCO‟s historic 
baggage. PESCO cannot be dissociated from 
how its initiators envisaged it during the 
European Convention back in 2003. At that 
time the aim was not for PESCO to be as 
inclusive as possible, but rather to assemble 
the happy few: “Those Member States whose 
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments 
to one another in this area with a view to the 
most demanding missions”, who would agree 
on “objectives concerning the level of 
investment expenditure on defence 
equipment”.  
 
The aim was to start with the big three, plus a 
number of countries with a significant defence 
industry. One of the big three was not willing 
to increase its defence budget, however, and 
so PESCO died a quick and quiet dead. So far 
for the past.  
 
What counts today, is what the Lisbon Treaty 
has to say about PESCO. The Treaty actually 
leaves it up to the Member States to define 
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BOTTOM UP, YES!    
There are many examples of countries who in 
fact have already established a very permanent 
and very structured cooperation (or even 
integration) among themselves, in a bilateral or 
multilateral framework. Benelux and Nordic 
cooperation, European Air Transport 
Command, the Eurocorps, and the 
Framework Nations Concept are all cases in 
point. Clearly Member States are not averse 
to the principle of PESCO as such nor to the 
permanent mutual commitment that it 
entails. Then why are they reluctant to 
launch PESCO in the EU framework? 
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what exactly “more binding commitments” 
should entail and what precisely should be the 
“level of investment expenditure”. And yet 
PESCO is often seen as a top-down 
machination, directed by Brussels or, even 
worse, the Commission. As if PESCO would 
limit national sovereignty. Defence Ministers 
in particular feel this way and hence plead for 
a bottom-up approach instead.  
 
TOP DOWN?   
In reality the Treaty stipulations on PESCO 
constantly refer to the Member States as 
sovereign actors. Every initiative must come 
from, and will be directed by, the capitals. The 
EUGS as well states that “Member States 
remain sovereign in their defence decisions”. 
Not the European External Action Service. 
Yes, “the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
has a key role to play”, but only  in “ assisting  
Member States to develop the capabilities 
stemming from the political goals set out in 
the EUGS”.  
 
And the Commission? Its role is to provide 
incentives, such as funds for R&T and, in the 
long term, for R&D. Member States will retain 
control however of this European Defence 
Fund in the making. The EIB is to act as a 
bank and to ease the financing of major 
equipment programmes. Furthermore, in 
dialogue with the EDA and  together with the 
Member States, it is a Commission priority to 
create a solid European defence industry. That 
does not amount to a hostile takeover of the 
defence industry by the Commission. Recent 
events (and non-events) in defence industrial 
cooperation clearly illustrate that the centre of 
gravity remains in the capitals.  
 
WHO IS AT THE TOP?  
As the head of the EDA, the HR/VP chairs 
the meeting of the ultimate decision-makers: 
the Ministers of Defence who constitute the 
Steering Board the EDA. Minsters of Defence 
are too modest when they see themselves as 
no more than bottom up contributors to 
 European defence. They are on top. However, 
so far they have remained reluctant to forge 
any cooperation that would create the critical 
mass needed  to finally tackle the strategic 
capability shortfalls. Are they afraid of the 
criteria to join PESCO? 
 
THE CRITERION 
Actually, the only criterion for Member States 
to take part in PESCO is to commit to a mind-
set. To be convinced that national sovereignty 
can be enhanced: first by developing national 
defence planning, subsequently by considering 
it as a basis for a permanent dialogue with 
partners, in order, finally, to forge, in full 
sovereignty, “a capability generation 
community” that favours pooled procurement 
and programmes that are commonly managed 
from cradle to grave. This is indeed a long-
term objective – but there are immediate 
benefits. Initiatives undertaken in the context 
of PESCO should be first in line for the 
incentives, such as access to EU funds, co-
funding  by EU institutions,  and the EIB 
ensuring tailor-made payment schedules for 
each and every Member State participating in 
such programmes.   
 
There is but a single PESCO, but within its 
framework every Member State can decide in 
full autonomy whether or not to participate in 
a specific programme. The same applies to 
CSDP operations. It will be much easier to 
cooperate however, for small and big Member 
States alike. 
 
AND NOW?  
Many EU Member States are already engaged 
in bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
programmes that actually fully meet the criteria 
to launch PESCO. They must be aware that by 
nevertheless not launching PESCO, they are 
missing out on important opportunities and 
incentives. But nobody seems to want to make 
the first move. We are waiting therefore for 
one Member State to show leadership. The 
train cars are lined up, we are only waiting for 
the engine. 
 3 
TO CONCLUDE 
The main threat to the EU and its Member 
States today is that we could lose our partners, 
in particular the US, as well as NATO, because 
of Europe‟s – so far – persistent reluctance to 
develop a credible security policy and forge a 
coherent and effective defence. Only the new 
way of looking at PESCO, as “Permanent 
Sovereign Cooperation”, is fit for purpose. It is 
to underpin the EUGS with the required 
capabilities. Because a strategy without 
capabilities is nothing but a hallucination.  
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